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CARL McGOWAN*
In a recent article in this Journal, Judge Loren A. Smith describes
and criticizes a trend towards "judicialization" in administrative law.'
Judge Smith perceives two types of judicialization. One is the "active
participation of the courts, through extensive judicial review, in the deci-
sions of executive bodies."'2 The second involves the "expanding use of
trial-like procedures for making governmental decisions, and, more gen-
erally, ... overproceduralization and excessive complexity in the process
of making public policy decisions."'3
Judge Smith sees in the trend towards judicialization a failure of
public confidence in government institutions. Since the traumatic days of
Vietnam and Watergate, he observes, the public has come to question
whether government experts really know what they are doing, and to
worry that government is too big and too involved in private affairs. At
the same time, he notes, citizens have come to expect government to
solve all manner of difficult policy questions. "People want safer and
cheaper products. They want cleaner air without any loss of jobs in
heavy industry. They want economic growth, but not industrial or com-
mercial development of the areas where they live and play."4
The political reaction to these developments, Judge Smith suggests,
has not been to reduce the power of executive agencies directly, but to
increase, in various ways, procedural constraints on administrative ac-
tion.5 This reaction, he argues, embodies a false premise: "To the extent
* Senior Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.
1. Smith, Judicialization: The Twilight of Administrative Law, 1985 DUKE L.J. 427.
Judge Smith served for four years as Chairman of the Administrative Conference of the United
States. Since his article was published he has been appointed as a Judge of the United States Claims
Court.
2. Smith, supra note 1, at 428.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 443-44 (emphasis in original).
5. Id. at 441-42.
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that we judicialize government, we necessarily tend to see the failures of
economic and social programs not as manifestations of wrong-headed
policies, but as bad technique or the flawed work of wrong-headed ad-
ministrators."' 6 This approach, Judge Smith claims, confuses "decisions
of will"- discretionary political decisions by administrative officials
based on their subjective evaluations of the costs and benefits of a pol-
icy-with "decisions of logic"-legal, judicial decisions marked by a
sense that there is an objectively correct answer to a problem. 7
To counter the trend towards judicialization, Judge Smith suggests
that we reevaluate fundamental notions of administrative law. Most es-
sentially, he proposes that, given the American preference for the free
market system, we should adopt a presumption against government in-
trusion into the private ordering of economic and social affairs., Imple-
mentation of this presumption would involve deregulation in many
areas.9 For the remaining areas, Judge Smith proposes a dramatic reduc-
tion in procedural restrictions on agency action. Judge Smith suggests,
for example, that Congress should reconsider the Government in the
Sunshine Act because of its excessive burden on the process of making
public policy decisions. 10 In addition, he maintains, the courts must re-
assess fundamental assumptions of administrative law insofar as they
lead to overproceduralization. Procedural due process rights have ex-
panded too far, he argues. As a solution, he proposes that courts give up
the notion that citizens have the "right" to a more or less formalized
hearing in every administrative proceeding.11 Instead, courts should re-
6. Id. at 430.
7. Id. at 430-31.
8. See id. at 435.
9. Judge Smith applauds, for example, the deregulation of the airline industry, which has
already taken place. See id. at 458 & n.102. His preference for deregulation, however, extends much
further. In another article dedicated to this subject, he suggests:
There are many people who feel that the role of government is to do for the society all the
things that need to be done. They feel that if there is racial discrimination, sexual discrimi-
nation, poverty, pollution, or unsafe products on the marketplace, it is the ultimate respon-
sibility of government to eliminate them. To the extent that there is a lack of consensus, I
think there is a significant intellectual position that accepts the view that those problems
are not the problems of government.
Smith, Judicial Review of Administrative Decisions, 7 HARV. J. L. & PuB. PoL'Y 61, 65 (1984). In
particular, Judge Smith has called for the repeal of the Occupational Safety and Health Act. Official
Questions Whether OSHA is Really Needed, ENGINEERING NEws-RECORD, Dec. 16, 1982, at 7.
10. The Administrative Conference, under Chairman Smith, questioned the desirability of the
openness in government required by the Government in the Sunshine Act. ADMINISTRATIVE CON-
FERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, 1984 RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS 17-19 (1984) (ACUS
RECOMMENDATION 84-3). See also Smith, supra note 1, at 428 & n.4; ADMINISTRATIVE CONFER-
ENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, 1982 REPORT 2 (foreword by Chairman Smith) (suggesting that
Federal Advisory Committee Act, Privacy Act, Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, and 1974
amendments to the Freedom of Information Act have also unduly burdened agencies).
1I. See Smith, supra note 1, at 459-60.
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turn to their traditional role as the defenders of recognized property
rights, an approach that would embody a clear distinction between
"rights" and "privileges." 12
Because Judge Smith's approach suggests such sweeping changes in
administrative law, we cannot simply test it on the level of any particular
policy suggestion. The answer to the question whether the Government
in the Sunshine Act should be repealed, for example, would not com-
pletely validate or invalidate Judge Smith's theory. Instead, we must ex-
amine both his description of the state of modern administrative law and
his normative judgments as to the proper functions of administrative law.
We can then compare the fundamental assumptions underlying Judge
Smith's approach with those embodied in modern administrative law. I
propose, in this article, to develop this comparison in three parts.
Part I considers the theory and practice of judicial review. The
questions here are threefold. How much do courts interfere with agency
decisions? What is the justification for judicial review of agency deci-
sions? Is this justification valid? Part II considers the contours of proce-
dural rights under the Administrative Procedure Act and under the due
process clause. Here, the questions are twofold. What are the proce-
dural rights afforded participants in agency proceedings? Are these
rights necessary? Finally, Part III considers the specific problem of de-
regulation. Does Judge Smith's suggested presumption in favor of pri-
vate ordering automatically lead to the conclusion that major areas of
government regulation should be dismantled? Assuming that deregula-
tion is desirable, what role should the courts play in deregulation? The
answers to all these questions suggest that Judge Smith has mapped out a
position that is fundamentally at odds with the modern approach to ad-
ministrative law.
I. JUDICIAL REVIEW
To begin to evaluate Judge Smith's claim that judicial review in ad-
ministrative cases has become excessive, we must first describe the extent
12. See id. at 460 n.105. Judge Smith, in another context, has described this theory of adminis-
trative law based on private rights as a "natural law" approach:
I think it behooves groups that are interested in restoring the health of our constitutional
system to focus on the resurrection and the perpetuation of [the notion of natural law].
Natural law provides a most important tool in helping us rethink the problems we face in
ensuring a legal and constitutional system that governs the administrative state. The
problems of agency abuse of power and regulation run riot, recorded so long ago in
Schechter, and opposite, equally serious concerns, of a judiciary on a binge of hyperactivity
can only be fully understood on the common ground of a general theory of constitutional
government. Natural law theory provides such a conceptual common ground for under-
standing the dilemmas we face in the judicial control of administrative agency action.
Smith, supra note 9, at 67.
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to which courts interfere with agency action. We must take note both of
raw statistics on judicial review and of the precise circumstances in
which intervention is most likely.
On the most basic statistical level, we can say without hesitation
that courts only rarely upset agency decisions. A recent report from the
Administrative Office of the United States Courts indicates that, in ad-
ministrative appeals, circuit courts reversed agencies in only 11.2% of
the cases.1 3 The significance of this statistic appears by comparing it to
the figures for other types of judicial review. In appeals from district
courts in civil suits involving the United States, for example, circuit
courts reversed in 25.1% of the cases. 14 Moreover, the 11.2% figure ex-
cludes the large numbers of administrative cases in which courts did not
even directly review agency action. More than half of the administrative
appeals were terminated other than "on the merits."' 15 Presumably most
of these cases were dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
To describe the extent to which courts interfere with agency deci-
sions we should also consider in which cases the courts are most likely to
exercise their authority. Unfortunately, precise statistics are not avail-
able in this area, possibly because it is difficult to categorize cases consis-
tently. I have suggested, however, that courts essentially apply a sliding
scale for review of agency decisions.1 6 This scale provides for three levels
of scrutiny; which level applies depends on the type of error allegedly
committed by the agency. The first, and most intense, level of scrutiny
applies to procedural errors.' 7 The second, a middle level of scrutiny,
involves alleged errors in statutory interpretation. In such cases, at least
in those in which the congressional directive is less than clear, courts
consider and often defer to the statutory interpretations of the agencies
charged with administering a congressional program. 8 Finally, in re-
viewing substantive policy decisions, a court operates under the greatest
measure of constraint. 19 The general outlines of this sliding scale have
been confirmed in several recent court decisions.20 Since the decision in
13. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED
STATES COURTS 261 (1985). This report includes administrative appeals decided during the one-
year period ending June 30, 1985. The figure represents the results from all circuits. The United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed agency decisions in only 9.3%
of administrative appeals. Id.
14. Id.
15. Of 2760 administrative appeals, only 1256 were terminated "on the merits." Id.
16. McGowan, Reflections on Rulemaking Review, 53 TUL. L. REV. 681, 691-92 (1979).
17. Id.
18. Id. at 692.
19. Id.
20. Although I originally illustrated this sliding scale with cases from my own court, see id. at
691-92 (citing Weyerhauser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1978)), recent Supreme Court
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Heckler v. Chaney,21 moreover, we may now add yet another point on
this sliding scale, one where courts should almost never interfere with an
agency. In Chaney, the Supreme Court held that the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA)22 requires that courts grant a presumption of un-
reviewability to an agency's decision not to initiate an enforcement ac-
tion.23 For such decisions, the Court noted, which are uniquely within
the discretion of the agencies, the question whether courts should inter-
fere is "in the first instance for Congress." 24
It is not important, at this point, to describe the precise workings
of-or to explain the justifications for-each level of scrutiny. We may
say generally, however, that the divisions of the sliding scale follow from
the spheres of expertise of courts and agencies and the clarity of the di-
rections given by Congress. 25 What is important is that we recognize
how infrequently courts actually interfere with agency proceedings.
When courts do interfere, moreover, they do so largely out of concern for
the fairness of the agencies' procedures or for fidelity to congressional
directives, not because they wish to substitute their judgments on essen-
tial policy questions for those of the agencies.26
opinions also fit comfortably into this framework. The highest level of scrutiny is illustrated by
Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188 (1982), in which the Court considered the propriety, under part
B of the Medicare program of the Social Security Act, of using private insurance carriers to adminis-
ter the payment of claims. The Court closely scrutinized the evidence concerning the risk of errone-
ous decision in the absence of a neutral hearing officer and the probable value of any additional
procedure. Id. at 198-200. Even with this searching inquiry, the Court concluded that due process
did not demand any additional procedure. Id. at 200.
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984), demonstrates
a middle level of judicial inquiry. The Court there held that, in interpreting a term in the Clean Air
Act that Congress had not specifically defined, it was appropriate to defer to the view of the agency
charged with administering the statute: "IT]he question for the court is whether the agency's answer
is based on a permissible construction of the statute." Id at 843.
Finally, the greatest amount of deference accorded an agency is illustrated by Baltimore Gas &
Elec. Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 462 U.S. 87 (1983), in which the Court reviewed a
series of generic Nuclear Regulatory Commission rules designed to evaluate the environmental ef-
fects of a nuclear power plant's fuel cycle. The Court insisted only that the agency decision be
"within the bounds of reasoned decisionmaking." Id. at 104. As justification for this deferential
approach, the Court noted that "a reviewing court must remember that the Commission is making
predictions, within its area of special expertise, at the frontiers of science." Id. at 103.
21. 105 S. Ct. 1649 (1985).
22. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (1982).
23. Chaney, 105 S. Ct. at 1655-56.
24. Id. at 1657.
25. See McGowan, supra note 16, at 692.
26. Indeed, courts frequently reiterate that it is not their function to make any of the policy
choices consigned to the agencies. See, eg., FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436
U.S. 775, 803 (1978); Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., 419 U.S. 281,285 (1974);
National Small Shipments Traffic Conference, Inc. v. CAB, 618 F.2d 819, 826 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
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Having described the relatively limited extent to which courts inter-
fere in agency proceedings, we may now consider what justifications exist
for even this limited interference. What purpose does judicial review of
agency action serve? The answer to this question is simple and clear.
Judicial review serves as a check on the power of the administrative agen-
cies. Given that Congress has the power, as in Chaney, to abolish judi-
cial review in some areas of administrative law, the path chosen by
Congress seems clear. Rather than directly controlling the agencies,
Congress largely has chosen to use the courts as a check on administra-
tive power.27
Is judicial review necessary to provide this check? The question is
really one of alternatives. Should agencies be allowed to operate entirely
on their own? Should Congress control them? Or should the President
provide the necessary oversight?
Our system of administrative law has long accepted the notion that
agencies may not be left entirely to their own devices. In the original
anti-delegation opinions, the Supreme Court enshrined this as a constitu-
tional principle: delegation of Congress's legislative powers to an agency
violated the separation-of-powers concept embodied in our Constitu-
tion.28 Although the Supreme Court quickly softened the edges of that
doctrine, 29 at least some vestiges of the doctrine remain,30 and it may
someday be revived.31 Even though the need for checks on administra-
27. See McGowan, Congress, Court, and Control of Delegated Power, 77 COLUM. L. REV.
1119, 1131 (1977) ("The pattern of the recent past has been that of a Congress largely content to rely
upon the courts.").
28. See Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 529-30 (1935); Panama Ref.
Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 420-21 (1935).
29. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935), and Panama Ref. Co. v.
Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935), are the only two examples of invalidation by the Supreme Court of
delegation by the Congress to an executive agency. As Justice Marshall has observed:
The notion that the Constitution narrowly confines the power of Congress to delegate au-
thority to administrative agencies, which was briefly in vogue in the 1930's, has been virtu-
ally abandoned by the Court for all practical purposes, at least in the absence of a
delegation creating "the danger of overbroad, unauthorized, and arbitrary application of
criminal sanctions in an area of [constitutionally] protected freedoms .... "
Federal Power Comm'n v. New England Power Co., 415 U.S. 345, 352-53 (1974) (Marshall, J.,
concurring) (quoting United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 272 (1967) (Brennan, J., concurring)).
30. Since 1935, the Court, while not invalidating any delegation of legislative power, has at
least inquired whether Congress provided standards to control the exercise of executive discretion.
See, eg., United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 167-78 (1968) (upholding FCC
rules promulgated pursuant to "public convenience, interest, or necessity" standard); Yakus v.
United States, 321 U.S. 414, 425 (1944) (holding that Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 did not
involve unconstitutional delegation of legislative power).
31. There is at least a glimmer of support for revival of the doctrine in several recent Supreme
Court opinions. See, eg., American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 543-48 (1981)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448
U.S. 607, 672-76 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
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tive power has long ceased to operate as a significant constitutional doc-
trine, the practical concern that agencies may, if left unchecked, abuse
their powers, remains a potent one. It was precisely this concern that
motivated Congress to adopt the APA in 1946.32
There is little reason to believe that this concern will ever dissipate.
Indeed, the concern does not depend on one's political stripe. For exam-
ple, those who favor more government regulation as a means to protect
the less powerful express concern that a government bureaucracy, if left
to itself, might become "captured" by well-organized private groups who
could use government power for their own ends.33 Those who favor less
government regulation, however, should fear the converse. An adminis-
trative agency, charged with a general mission to regulate in some area,
may develop a zeal for regulation that exceeds the bounds of the original
congressional scheme.34 From either perspective, the response is the
same: administrative agencies must be controlled by some external au-
thority. But where to find that control?
Congress long ago recognized that it often could not directly regu-
late in the complex modern American social and economic environment.
It therefore delegated power broadly to administrative agencies; the
Supreme Court has upheld such delegations since the late 1930's. 35 In-
32. See, e.g., Federal Administrative Procedure: Hearings Before the House Comm. on the Judi-
ciary, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1945) (statement of David A. Simmons, President, American Bar
Association) (agencies "threatena to develop a 'fourth branch' of the Government for which there is
no sanction in the Constitution"), reprinted in ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT, LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 48 (1946); 92 CONG. REC. 2151 (1946) (statement of Sen. McCarran)
("I desire to emphasize the... provisions for judicial review, because [they are] something in which
the American public has been and is much concerned, harkening back, if we may, to the Constitu-
tion of the United States, which sets up the judicial branch of the Government for the redress of
human wrongs ...."), reprinted in ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
79th Cong., 2d Sess. 305 (1946); S. REP. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 31 (1945) ('IT]he enforce-
ment of the bill, by the independent judicial interpretation and application of its terms, is a function
which is clearly conferred upon the courts .... Judicial review is of utmost importance .... It is
indispensable since its mere existence generally precludes the arbitrary exercise of powers or assump-
tion of powers not granted."), reprinted in ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT, LEGISLATIVE HIS-
TORY, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 217 (1946). Several commentators of the period expressed this same
concern. See, e.g, Dickinson, Administrative Procedure Act: Scope and Grounds of Broadened Judi-
cial Review, 33 A.B.A. J. 434, 435 (1947); McCarran, Improving "Administrative Justice". Hearings
and Evidence; Scope of Judicial Review, 32 A.B.A. J. 827, 827-29 (1946); Sherwood, The Federal
Administrative Procedure Act, 41 Am. POL. Sci. REV. 271, 271-72 (1947).
33. See Note, Incorporation of Independent Agencies into the Executive Branch, 94 YALE L.J.
1766, 1769 & n.25 (1985).
34. The Federal Trade Commission is, perhaps, the agency most often accused on this score.
See, eg., Weingast & Moran, Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory Poli-
cymaking by the Federal Trade Commission, 91 J. POL. ECON. 765, 775-77 (1983).
35. See L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 37 (1965); Neustadt, The
Administration's Regulatory Reform Program: An Overview, 32 AD. L. REV. 129, 129-30 (1980);
Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667, 1695 (1975).
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deed, efforts by Congress to regulate directly in areas ordinarily assigned
to administrative agencies have been generally unsuccessful. 36 But are
there other methods by which Congress could control the agencies, per-
haps not by displacing them in directly determining the course of regula-
tion, but by pruning unwise or misdirected policies? The most prominent
proposal for such congressional control, the legislative veto, is no longer
available as a result of the decision in INS v. Chadha.37 Even assuming
that Chadha does not foreclose other means of legislative control over
the agencies, 38 it is apparent that Congress has neither the resources nor
the inclination to exercise more than occasional oversight of administra-
tive proceedings.39 Almost by definition, congressional oversight cannot
treat unfairness or overreaching in the ordinary case. Congress's atten-
tion will be focused only on widespread problems or truly egregious
cases. In my judgment, such occasional oversight is not enough. What,
then, of presidential oversight?
Every President since Richard Nixon has sought to impose presi-
dential oversight on administrative agencies.4° In his first term, Presi-
dent Reagan issued Executive Order 12,291,41 the most far-reaching of
36. One prominent example of such failure is the Clean Air Act. See Graham, The Failure of
Agency-Forcing: The Regulation of Airborne Carcinogens Under Section 112 of the Clean Air Act,
1985 DUKE L.J. 100, 115-42; Schoenbrod, Goals Statutes or Rules Statutes: The Case of the Clean Air
Act, 30 UCLA L. REv. 740, 748-51 (1983).
37. 462 U.S. 919 (1983). In Chadha, the Supreme Court held the legislative veto unconstitu-
tional. Because the legislative veto did not require the approval of both Houses and never required
the signature of the President or a supermajority of both Houses to override his veto, the Court
believed it violated procedural requirements explicitly mandated by the Constitution for valid legis-
lation. Id. at 944-51.
38. Judge Stephen Breyer, for example, has recently advanced a creative solution to the Chadha
problem:
Legislators might be able to create mechanisms that function like the veto but comply with
the constitutionally prescribed form of legislation. For example, Congress might decide to
delegate power to an agency but allow the latter's action to take effect only if Congress
later passes a special law confirming it.
Breyer, Reforming Regulation, 59 TUL. L. REv. 4, 11 (1984). With this approach, the agency would
merely propose a regulation. Congress would have to enact the proposal into law.
39. See R. LITAN & W. NORDHAUS, REFORMING FEDERAL REGULATION 60-81 (1983); Stew-
art, supra note 35, at 1695 n.128.
40. The Nixon Administration used a "quality of life" review process-implemented by Office
of Management and Budget Circular A-95-that, although not taking the form of an executive or-
der, served much the same regulatory oversight function as the later Ford, Carter, and Reagan
executive orders. See 1 A. REITzE, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 112 (1972); McGowan, Regulatory
Analysis and Judicial Review, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 627, 632 (1981). President Ford signed Executive
Order 11,821, 3 C.F.R. 926 (1971-75 Compilation), which required executive agencies to prepare
Inflation Impact Statements when preparing major legislative or regulatory proposals. Executive
Order 12,044, 3 C.F.R. 152 (1979), signed by President Carter, imposed a detailed regulatory analy-
sis requirement on executive agencies undertaking major regulatory proposals. See McGowan,
supra, at 632 (describing Nixon, Ford, and Carter oversight orders).
41. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982).
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these attempts at presidential oversight. The Order's principal provision
requires that federal agencies perform cost-benefit analyses prior to im-
plementing any major regulatory proposal.42 For several reasons, how-
ever, even this relatively ambitious program of oversight has not had a
significant impact on federal regulation.
Executive Order 12,291 does not affect the independent agencies.43
Nor does it apply to regulations that are not "major." 44 With respect to
those few regulations that are actually reviewed, moreover, the Order
does not appear to change the character of regulations with any
frequency.45
Even if cost-benefit analyses were extended to all agency regulations,
and more stringently applied, as Judge Smith apparently favors,46 the
beneficial effects are highly uncertain. Cost-benefit analysis is notori-
ously imprecise.47 In particular, cost-benefit analysis generally empha-
sizes economic values and fails to account satisfactorily for intangible
concerns, such as aesthetics or freedom from safety risks.48 If strictly
enforced (and especially if applied to already-existing rules), cost-benefit
analysis could work effective deregulation in many areas. Perhaps dereg-
ulation is desirable in some of these areas. But, if so, cost-benefit analysis
is not the best way to implement it. Cost-benefit analysis simply adds a
procedural hurdle to the rulemaking process. 49 Is this not precisely the
type of "judicialization" with which Judge Smith finds fault?
Aside from the question whether cost-benefit analysis is a desirable
control over administrative discretion, it may be that any form of presi-
dential oversight of the administrative process will prove inadequate.
Neither the President nor his staff will ordinarily have the time or exper-
42. Id. § 2, 3 C.F.R. at 128.
43. The Order specifically exempts the independent regulatory agencies from coverage. Id.
§ l(d), 3 C.F.R. at 128.
44. "Major" regulations include those imposing costs of $100 million or more. Id. § l(b)(1), 3
C.F.R. at 127.
45. See PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE ON REGULATORY RELIEF, REAGAN ADMINISTRATION
REGULATORY ACHIEVEMENTS 55 (1983) (only one-ninth of regulations reviewed under Order dur-
ing 1981 and 1982 were revised or returned to agencies for further consideration); id. at 64 (only one
percent of regulations reviewed were withdrawn).
46. See Smith, supra note 1, at 451-52, 451 n.82 (citing statutory proposals for cost-benefit
analyses with apparent approval).
47. See Fisher, Controlling Government Regulation: Cost-Benefit Analysis Before and After the
Cotton-Dust Case, 36 AD. L. REv. 179, 182-83 (1984).
48. See Landey, The Federal Regulatory Process An Overview of an Enervated System, 36 AD.
L. REV. 75, 80 (1984).
49. See Fisher, supra note 47, at 203-04.
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tise to review all proposed regulations.50 Such oversight, moreover, in-
vites wild swings in administrative policy, changing as often as every four
or eight years, with each new administration. Not only are such swings
undesirable as a policy matter, but, to the extent that they reflect an ad-
ministration chafing under congressional directions, they also highlight
the potential constitutional infirmities of presidential oversight.5'
That there are significant disadvantages to entrusting the regulatory
process entirely to self-policing by the administrative agencies, or to con-
gressional or presidential oversight, seems certain. Nevertheless, various
forms of such controls do exist, and may provide useful adjuncts to judi-
cial review as means of controlling the regulatory process. Naturally,
our system of administrative law should not reject any such alternate
forms of control out of hand. The point advanced here, however, is that
due to lack of fully effective alternatives, judicial review must remain the
central means of ensuring that agencies do not abuse their administrative
powers.
II. OVERPROCEDURALIZATION
Judge Smith's second main contention is that the administrative
process has become "overproceduralized," and that the courts and Con-
gress have increasingly insisted on trial-like procedures before an agency
may act.5 2 The response to this contention must be formulated on two
levels, the descriptive and the normative. The descriptive question asks
50. See DeMuth, Constrain Regulatory Costs, Part I. The White House Review Programs, REa-
ULATION, Jan.-Feb. 1980, at 13, 16 (describing the cross-delegation between agencies within execu-
tive branch of responsibilities for implementing regulatory review programs).
51. The argument over the legality of presidential oversight focuses on the separation-of.powers
doctrine. The Executive is empowered to implement legislative enactments, but not to create them
unilaterally. If the President imposes, for example, a cost-benefit analysis requirement on executive
agencies and hence on the statutes they administer, it is tantamount to adding statutory require-
ments that Congress neither included nor desired. Such an addition could be seen as an executive
encroachment on the legislative prerogative in violation of the separation-of-powers principle. See
Rosenberg, Beyond the Limits of Executive Power: Presidential Control of Agency Rulemaking
Under Executive Order 12,291, 80 MICH. L. REv. 193, 195-220 (1981). But see Shane, Presidential
Regulatory Oversight and the Separation of Powers: The Constitutionality of Executive Order No.
12,291, 23 ARIz. L. REv. 1235, 1243-62 (1981). Indeed, at least one court has invalidated a portion
of Executive Order 12,291 on precisely these grounds. See Environmental Defense Fund v. Thomas,
627 F. Supp. 566, 570 (D.D.C. 1986).
52. Judge Smith at points appears to distinguish between overproceduralization in general-or
"government delay and waste"-on the one hand, see Smith, supra note 1, at 459, and excessive
reliance on trial-like procedures on the other, see id. at 461-64. This distinction is rather unsatisfac-
tory. Under the rubric of overproceduralization, for example, Judge Smith remarks that "[t]he right
to a more or less formalized hearing has come to be held as an article of faith." Id. at 459-60. At
other times, however, Judge Smith has equated overproceduralization with the excessive use of trial-
like procedures. See ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, 1981 REPORT 2
(chairman's foreword). For convenience of discussion, I will assume that overproceduralization is
226' [Vol. 1986:217
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what procedures are currently required in administrative proceedings.
The normative question is whether these procedures are necessary.
A description of the procedural restrictions imposed on administra-
tive agencies must begin with the blunt reality that most administrative
action is informal, taken without any trial-like procedure whatsoever.53
For the remaining group of formal agency actions, moreover, commenta-
tors have observed a marked trend away from the use of the trial-like
procedures embodied in the APA's sections 556 and 557.54 Instead,
agencies have increasingly used the "notice and comment" rulemaking
allowed by section 553. This trend is a direct response to the need to
make administrative proceedings more efficient. 55
Another major event helping to streamline the administrative pro-
cess was the Supreme Court's decision in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power
Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council.5 6 In Vermont Yankee, the
Court considered a challenge to an Atomic Energy Commission (AEC)
rule specifying which spent-fuel hazards the AEC would consider in
making adjudicatory decisions to license specific plants. The AEC fol-
lowed a notice and comment rulemaking procedure in promulgating the
rule. The Natural Resources Defense Council challenged the rule, claim-
ing that the AEC should have permitted discovery and cross-examina-
tion and that these procedural requirements could be imposed upon the
agency by a court.5 7 The Supreme Court emphatically rejected that posi-
tion, holding that a court could not overturn a rule on the basis of proce-
dural devices not specifically required by the APA.58 Since Vermont
Yankee, the Court has reiterated the point that courts may impose proce-
the general problem, and that excessive use of trial-like procedures is one specific example of that
problem. The focus of my response, however, is on the use of trial-like procedures.
53. Professor Davis gives an estimate of the figures on informal action:
Probably about ninety percent of all administrative action involves a combination of
(1) informal action, that is, action taken without trial procedure, (2) discretionary determi-
nations that are mostly or altogether uncontrolled or unguided by announced rules or prin-
ciples, and (3) lack of judicial review in fact, whether or not the action is theoretically
reviewable.
2 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 8:1, at 158 (2d ed. 1979). See also Gardner, The
Procedures by Which Informal Action is Taken, 24 AD. L. REV. 155, 156 (1972).
54. See 1 K. DAVIS, supra note 53, § 6:8, at 475 ("The fundamental movement away from
rulemaking on the record has been strong and pervasive.").
55. See, eg., Robinson, The Making ofAdministrative Policy: Another Look at Rulemaking and
Adjudication and Administrative Procedure Reform, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 485, 516-17 (1970) (explain-
ing FrC's justification for its use of rulemaking: "[In general, rulemaking is likely to be more
efficient ... than adjudication .... "); Verkuil, The Emerging Concept of Administrative Procedure,
78 COLUM. L. REV. 258, 297 (1978) ("[T]he trend towards rulemaking reduces the time and expense
of the ratemaking process .... ").
56. 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
57. Id. at 545.
58. Id. at 545-48.
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dural requirements beyond those specified in the APA only in extraordi-
nary circumstances.59 The consequence of the trend towards notice and
comment rulemaking and the Vermont Yankee decision is clear: agen-
cies are increasingly free to choose less complicated methods of action. 60
This trend towards fewer procedural restrictions on agency action
appears in the Supreme Court's interpretation of the due process clause
as well. Although the Court's decision in Goldberg v. Kelly6 may have
suggested to some that a formalized hearing would be required whenever
an agency denied or revoked benefits under an entitlement scheme62-
disability, Medicare, and unemployment, for example-the Court has
made clear that no such absolute rule applies. In Mathews v. Eldridge,63
the Court announced that it would balance the following three factors in
determining whether an agency's procedures satisfy the requirements of
due process:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action;
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through
the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or
substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's inter-
est, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative
burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement
would entail.64
Since Eldridge, the Court has expanded the notion of due process as
a balance between the costs and benefits of procedural restrictions. Thus,
the Court applies this balancing approach not only to determine whether
a hearing will be required, as in Eldridge, but also to determine how
formal the hearing, if required, will be.65 Indeed, the Court has even
begun to apply this balancing approach to problems entirely unrelated to
the questions whether a hearing is required in agency decisionmaking,
59. See, eg., Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 312 (1979).
60. See Byse, Vermont Yankee and the Evolution of Administrative Procedure: A Somewhat
Different View, 91 HARV. L. REv. 1823, 1823 (1978) (suggesting that Vermont Yankee provides "a
needed corrective to an unwholesome trend in the lower federal courts" towards requiring additional
procedures in agency action).
61. 397 U.S. 254 (1970). In Kelly, the Court held that a pretermination evidentiary hearing was
required before state officials could terminate welfare benefits. Id. at 264.
62. Cf Diver, Book Review, 94 YALE L.L 1529, 1529 (1985) (noting that Goldberg did not
bring about a "due process 'revolution' ").
63. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
64. Id. at 335. The issue in Eldridge was whether due process required the recipient of social
security disability payments to be afforded an evidentiary hearing prior to termination of benefits.
The Court balanced the three factors and determined that a hearing was not required. Id. at 349.
65. See, e-g., Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460,476 (1983) (indicating that due process is a flexible
concept); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 680 (1977) ("[E]ven if the need for procedural safe-
guards were clear, the question would remain whether the incremental benefit could justify the
cost.").
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and if so, what type. In INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 66 for example, the Court
ruled that the exclusionary rule does not apply in a deportation proceed-
ing. In doing so, the Court deliberately weighed the social costs and ben-
efits of extending the rule beyond its original criminal law context. 67 Far
from increasing the procedural requirements for agency action, the
Supreme Court has in the past few years adopted a balancing approach,
the main effect of which is to make the due process concept extremely
flexible.
With this description of the current state of the law concerning ad-
ministrative procedure, we may now ask the normative question: are the
procedural restrictions that remain in effect really necessary? We may
begin to answer this question by making explicit the assumption that the
goal of these procedural requirements is to increase the fairness and ac-
curacy of agency decisions. Even Judge Smith acknowledges that these
procedural restrictions are intended to serve some purpose. His point,
however, is that there are costs associated with additional procedure, in-
cluding delay, costs to the government in providing the procedures, and
costs to the parties participating in agency proceedings. 68 Surely we can
concede that there is a trade-off between fairness and efficiency without
automatically concluding that fairness must go. Rule by a single dictator
at each agency might be an extremely efficient method of procedure, but
one with very little prospect of fairness. Conversely, requiring an agency
to prove in a court of law that it has considered all relevant factors before
making any decision might guarantee nonarbitrary decisionmaking, but
would paralyze the administrative process. The question is where to
draw the line between these two extremes.
Unfortunately, the answer to this question is a complicated empiri-
cal one. The fairness and costliness of procedures can be accurately as-
66. 468 U.S. 1032 (1984).
67. See id. at 1046.
68. In his first report as Chairman of the Administrative Conference, Judge Smith wrote of the
trade-off between accuracy and costs:
We know that administrative procedures, even the most informal are not cost-free. Profes-
sional time is expensive, and the demands for it escalate rapidly as we move to ever more
judicialized, adversary-type proceedings. Delay, too, is expensive....
On the other hand, administrative expedition may involve different costs. Too often,
agencies are perceived as not having sufficiently thought out the consequences of proposed
courses of action....
There is no easy answer to this dilemma. But surely it is a step forward to recognize
that the principal test of a particular procedure or of a procedural system is: Does it
produce generally accurate results with an expenditure of societal resources appropriate to
the issue involved?
ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, 1981 REPORT 2-3 (chairman's foreword).
See Smith, Foreword, 18 NEW ENG. L. Rnv. 777, 779-80 (1983) ("I take justice to be the most
important of all procedural values .... Justice is not a free good.... Who is to pay and how much
justice are we willing to pay for?").
Vol. 1986:217]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 1986:217
sessed only in the context of the entire regulatory system. We cannot
simply consider a single egregious example, like the infamous "peanut
butter" case,69 as indicating a need to reduce administrative procedure.
Instead, we must try to find a measure of the value of fair procedures,
and compare that value to the costs of implementing these procedures on
a government-wide basis.
We can illustrate the difficulty of such a calculation with a specific
example, the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA). 70
NEPA requires federal agencies to prepare an Environmental Impact
Statement (EIS) for all major actions significantly affecting the environ-
ment. The EIS must disclose and evaluate alternative actions and their
environmental consequences. 71 Since its enactment, NEPA has been at-
tacked as imposing paperwork burdens and delays, creating procedural
traps for the unwary, and failing altogether to affect agency decisions.7 2
Critics have also complained about NEPA's less than satisfactory per-
formance as a tool for decisionmaking on particular projects.73 Despite
these theoretical criticisms and complaints in individual cases, for years
no comprehensive study of NEPA procedures was ever undertaken. 74
When such studies were finally completed, the results showed that
NEPA procedures did have a positive effect on agency decisionmaking,
one sufficient to justify their continued use, despite their obvious costs. 75
69. In 1959, the Food and Drug Administration began a proceeding to determine whether pea-
nut butter should have 87% or 90% peanuts. Nine years later, after a transcript of 7736 pages had
been amassed, see 1 K. DAVIS, supra note 53, § 6:8, at 475, the rule finally issued, and was later
upheld. See Corn Products Co. v. FDA, 427 F.2d 511 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 957 (1970).
70. 42 U.S.C. §§ 43214347 (1982).
71. Id. § 4332.
72. See, eg., FairfaxA Disaster in the Environmental Movement, 199 SCIENCE 743 (1978); Sax,
The (Unhappy) Truth About NEPA, 26 OKLA. L. REV. 239 (1973).
73. Perhaps one of the most often criticized applications of the NEPA procedure was the
Westway project in Manhattan. See, eg., N.Y. Times, Jan. 26, 1985, at 20, col. I (noting 12-year
delay and cost of project); N.Y. Times, June 4, 1984, § II, at 1, col. I (discussing Westway as exam-
ple of paralyzed government). The plan for Westway, a replacement highway on the west side of the
city, was originally formulated in 1971. Litigation began almost immediately, and centered on the
need for a detailed assessment of the potential environmental consequences of the project. The liti-
gation continued for the next 14 years, until the Second Circuit rejected a final supplemental EIS for
the project. Sierra Club v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 772 F.2d 1043 (2d Cir. 1985),
Thereafter, the project was abandoned.
74. In 1975, Professor Stewart expressed his concern on this point: "There is a pressing need
for rigorous empirical study of the effects on agency decisions of procedural requirements such as
those fashioned by the courts on the basis of NEPA." Stewart, supra note 35, at 1780 n.526.
75. The Council on Environmental Quality first performed such a study in the mid-1970's,
concluding: "Environmental assessments and impact statements have substantially improved gov-
ernment decisions over the past six years .... " COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, ENVI-
RONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENTS: AN ANALYSIS OF SIX YEARS' EXPERIENCE BY SEVENTY
FEDERAL AGENCIES 2 (1976). A follow-up study by the Environmental Protection Agency focused
on two specific types of projects. The EPA reported that NEPA procedures resulted in at least one
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More such empirical research should be undertaken. 76 The results
of such studies, of course, may suggest that certain procedures are not
valuable enough to justify the costs of implementing them. That debate
is for another day. For now, the question is only whether we have suffi-
cient information to conclude that major changes in the procedural
framework for administrative decisions are warranted. I submit that we
do not.
III. DEREGULATION
Throughout the Judicialization article, Judge Smith emphasizes that
there is a presumption in favor of the private ordering of social and eco-
nomic affairs, and that this presumption supports deregulation in many
areas.77 How far, and by what means, should we implement that pre-
sumption? The question invites a complicated, extended philosophical
and political debate that would venture well beyond the scope of my in-
tended remarks. For these purposes, I am content to note that the pub-
lic, politicians, and political analysts all hold widely divergent views on
the question of deregulation.
One can see the extent of the disagreement in the developments,
over the past few years, in the effort to deregulate. In the late 1970's, the
Carter Administration proposed deregulation in several industries-air-
lines, energy, trucking, railroads, banking, and telecommunications. 78
Some of these proposals were eventually implemented. 79 Two common
features of these deregulation efforts were that they concerned economic,
major positive change in the design of 50 out of 51 waste water treatment facilities and 8 out of 9
coal-fired power plants reviewed. COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, ENVIRONMENTAL
Qu Lrry-1980, at 371-72 (1980). The EPA also compared the costs of these additional procedures
against the benefits:
After calculating project cost increases resulting from an EIS and project cost savings
resulting from an EIS, EPA found that even though costs increased in a majority (31) of
the [waste water] plants, the savings in the 19 other plants, where costs were reduced, more
than offset total increases. The net savings as a result of EISs for 49 plants was $34.5
million. One EIS achieved extraordinary savings of $438.4 million because a plant was
redesigned on a much smaller, more appropriate scale than the one originally proposed.
Id. at 372.
76. In another recent essay, Judge Smith describes many of the costs of judicialization of the
administrative process. Smith, Judicialization of the Administrative Process: The Fine Print, in 2 THE
LEGAL SYSTEM ASSAULT ON THE ECONOMY 32-36 (1986). This essay, however, does not answer
the empirical question whether such costs outweigh the benefits of administrative procedures.
77. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 1, at 435.
78. See Neustadt, supra note 35, at 134-35.
79. See, e.g., Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (codified in
scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.); Motor Carrier Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-296, 94 Stat. 793 (codi-
fied in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.).
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as opposed to social,80 regulations, and that they were implemented by
congressional action. With the change of administrations in 1980, both
of these features of deregulation changed. The Reagan Administration
promised deregulation on all scores, both economic and social.8" In ad-
dition, the new administration implemented much deregulation by ad-
ministrative fiat, rather than at the behest of Congress. 2
Both of these features of the new approach to deregulation create
conflict. Although the public has generally been supportive of deregula-
tion in the economic fields, there is much more vocal and widespread
opposition to the current administration's proposals to deregulate in the
social context.8 3 Efforts to delay or rescind regulations, moreover, may
conflict with explicit and implicit directions from Congress. Should the
courts be involved in resolving these conflicts?
A classic illustration of this problem appears in the Reagan Admin-
istration's effort to rescind a rule requiring "passive restraints" in new
automobiles. In 1977, the Department of Transportation's National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) issued a regulation re-
quiring the installation of passive restraints, either airbags or passive seat
belts, in large cars by 1982 and in all cars by 1984.84 In February of
1981, however, the new Secretary of Transportation reopened the
rulemaking, citing changed economic circumstances and, in particular,
economic difficulties in the automobile industry, as justifications for re-
considering the rule.8 5 Two months later, NHTSA ordered a one-year
delay in implementation of the standard.8 6 Several months later,
80. One can generally distinguish between social and economic regulation. Social regulation
includes the federal programs that use regulatory techniques to achieve broad social goals-a cleaner
environment, a safer workplace, safer and more effective consumer products, and equal employment
opportunities, for example. Economic regulation involves government intervention in the market-
place-for example, price controls, route allocations, and subsidies. Further distinctions in these
general categories may be possible. See, eg., O'Reilly, Judicial Review ofAgency Deregulation: Alter-
natives and Problems for the Courts, 37 VAND. L. REV. 509, 510-12 (1984) (distinguishing economic,
safety, environmental, and income-transfer regulations).
81. See, eg., ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 42 (1982) ("Many government programs,
such as detailed safety regulation or the provision of specific goods (rather than money) to the poor,
are best described as paternalistic.").
82. The Reagan Administration began, for example, by "freezing," as of Inauguration Day,
1981, many rules enacted or pending during the final days of the Carter Administration. Postpone-
ment of Pending Regulations, 46 Fed. Reg. 11,227 (1981).
83. See, eg., THE CONSERVATION FOUNDATION, STATE OF THE ENVIRONMENT 1982, at 425
(1982) (poll indicating public support for environmental regulation); Neustadt, supra note 35, at 132
("[T]he public still wants to achieve the goals of regulation---especially in environment, health, and
safety-but wants the process better managed.").
84. 49 C.F.R. § 571.208 (1978).
85. 46 Fed. Reg. 12,033 (1981).
86. Id. at 21,172.
[Vol. 1986:217
REPLY TO JUDICIALIZATION
NHTSA rescinded the rule altogether.8 7 The agency reasoned that the
passive restraint standard would not create the safety benefits that had
been originally predicted. The agency determined that the industry re-
sponse to the standard would be to install passive belts rather than
airbags. Such belts, however, could be detached by the consumer. This
possibility, the agency concluded, dramatically decreased the likelihood
of obtaining safety benefits sufficient to justify the costs of implementing
the standard.88
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company and others pe-
titioned for review of the rescission order. In State Farm Mutual Auto-
mobile Insurance Co. v. Department of Transportation (the Airbags case),
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
held that NHTSA's rescission was "arbitrary and capricious," but re-
manded to permit the agency to provide satisfactory reasons for the re-
scission. 89 The Supreme Court, although not accepting all of the
reasoning in the court of appeals opinion, concluded that the agency had
failed to supply a "reasoned analysis" for its change in policy.90 The
Court found that NHTSA had arbitrarily refused even to consider
whether the standard could be maintained in some form (by making
airbag technology mandatory, for example).91 In addition, the Court
concluded that NHTSA had too quickly dismissed the potential safety
benefits of automatic belts. The agency had failed, for example, to con-
sider the option of requiring nondetachable automatic seatbelts.92
Judge Smith deeply disagrees with the result reached in the Airbags
case. He views the issue as "a classic political controversy,193 and thus
would have the courts exercise minimal review. Although the Court
considered the issue a procedural matter, he notes, the effect of the deci-
sion was to reverse a "decision of will" made by the Administration. 94
Having outlined the problem, and Judge Smith's objection to the
Supreme Court's resolution, we may now consider the question illus-
trated by the Airbags case: what should be the courts' role in decisions to
deregulate? We may begin with the broad concession that it is pro-
87. Id. at 53,419.
88. See id. at 53,421.
89. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Department of Transp., 680 F.2d 206, 230-41 (D.C. Cir.
1982), vacated sub nom. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29
(1983).
90. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42 (1983)
("lAin agency changing its course by rescinding a rule is obligated to supply a reasoned analysis for
the change beyond that which may be required when an agency does not act in the first instance.").
91. Id. at 48.
92. Id. at 55.
93. Smith, supra note 1, at 453.
94. Id. at 454-55.
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foundly not the duty of the courts to resolve policy questions. That a
majority of the public disfavors deregulation in social areas, for example,
could not have been the grounds for invalidating the rescission of the
passive restraints rule. But that is not Judge Smith's objection to the
Airbags decision.
Judge Smith objects to the Airbags decision, not because the Court
ruled directly on policy grounds, but because the Court's approach "has
the potential to convert a procedural review into at least temporary con-
trol over substantive policy."' 95 This objection, at least as phrased, seems
wide of the mark. The same criticism could apply to any court decision
that invalidates agency action on procedural grounds. Suppose, for ex-
ample, that the head of NHTSA had decided to rescind the passive re-
straints rule because the automobile manufacturers had bribed him, and
suppose that this fact could be proven. There is no doubt that the deci-
sion could be invalidated in a court of law. Yet there is also no question
that an order invalidating the rule on those grounds would have an effect
on substantive policy.
Judge Smith means to say more than this. His real attack is on the
fact that the Court required the agency to give a satisfactory explanation
for its decision to rescind the rule. This test, he suggests, "can be used
not only to overturn egregiously arbitrary acts, but also to intrude into
the realm of legitimate discretionary agency decisionmaking. ' 96 Accord-
ing to Judge Smith, there is no "bright line" between the two.97
At bottom, then, Judge Smith disagrees with the Court's Airbags
decision because he simply does not think that an administrator should
have to explain a "decision of will" to a court. Yet reviewing such deci-
sions is precisely the role, I believe, that courts should perform. Let me
briefly elaborate on that point. First, it is important to disabuse ourselves
of the notion that judicial review interferes with pure "decisions of will."
Return for a moment to the Airbags case. The NHTSA officials there
contended that there were changed circumstances -i.e., new data-that
justified a change in policy. These officials did not simply bring new auto
safety commandments down from the mountaintop. And well they
could not. The true "decision of will" is the congressional directive it-
self. These officials were merely implementing that directive-Congress
has not empowered these officials to implement its directives one way
today and another way tomorrow, depending on whim. Rather, Con-
gress gives directions, and the agency must implement them. The initial
agency implementation-i.e., new regulations-may be tested for com-
95. Id. at 454.
96. Id.
97. Id.
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pliance with the congressional directive. Similarly, when an agency
changes its implementation strategy, it must again demonstrate that it is
complying with the congressional directive. Such determinations are for
the courts. As we have seen, no other branch of government is fully
capable of ensuring that agencies remain faithful to congressional
directives.
Let us observe, second, that the Airbags decision did not dictate the
course of auto safety policy. Instead, in reaction to the Court's direction,
the agency suspended the passive restraints requirement for a year, to
allow the agency to formulate a response.98 A little over a year after the
Airbags decision, the agency successfully implemented a new rule calling
for passive restraints by model year 1990 (as opposed to the 1984 dead-
line in the original rule), with the possibility that no standard would be-
come effective if a sufficient number of states passed mandatory seatbelt
usage laws.99
Finally, let me suggest that the Airbags decision has not substan-
tially increased the intrusion of the courts into the discretion of the agen-
cies. We should note, in this regard, that courts have long required an
explanation for departures from a settled course of agency policy or in-
terpretation; 100 the Airbags decision merely places the Supreme Court's
imprimatur on this settled doctrine. In addition, although no trend has
been conclusively established, there is little to indicate that courts have
used the Airbags precedent to reverse agency decisions at any higher rate
than normal.10 1 Whatever the theoretical significance of the Airbags de-
cision, in practice courts have continued to review agency decisions in
the same fashion as before.
98. 48 Fed. Reg. 39,908 (1983).
99. 49 Fed. Reg. 28,962 (1984).
100. See, eg., Natural Resources Defense Council v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031, 1050 n.23 (D.C. Cir.
1979); Local 777, Democratic Union Org. Comm., Seafarers Int'l Union of N. Am. v. NLRB, 603
F.2d 862, 882 (D.C. Cir. 1978); International Union, UAW v. NLRB, 459 F.2d 1329, 1341 (D.C.
Cir. 1972); Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. FCC, 454 F.2d 1018, 1026-27 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Greater
Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 852 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923
(1971).
101. See, eg., Salt River Project Agriculture Improvement & Power Dist. v. United States, 762
F.2d 1053, 1064 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (citing Airbags decision and affirming agency order); Central & S.
Motor Freight Tariff Ass'n v. United States, 757 F.2d 301, 320 & n.113 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (same);
New York State Comm'n on Cable Television v. FCC, 749 F.2d 804, 808 & n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(same); Wold Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 735 F.2d 1465, 1477 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (same); see also
Virginia State Corp. Comm'n v. FCC, 737 F.2d 388, 399 (4th Cir. 1984) (Airbags case cited in
dissenting opinion; majority affirms agency order); Western Coal Traffic League v. United States,
719 F.2d 772, 784 (5th Cir. 1984) (same). But see National Black Media Coalition v. FCC, 775 F.2d
342, 355 & n.16 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (citing Airbags decision and reversing agency order); Maryland
People's Counsel v. FERC, 761 F.2d 780, 785 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (same).
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IV. CONCLUSION
Judge Smith has written a "deliberately provocative" article.10 2 In
it, he suggests that administrative law has become rudderless, that we
need to develop a new theory for administrative law.' 0 3 His proposed
replacement theory, although only dimly apparent in the Judicialization
article, is that agencies are generally best left to function on their own.
In particular, he suggests that judicial review is generally unnecessary,
except to protect vested property rights.104
The real value of Judge Smith's essay is to force us to reassess the
theory and practice of administrative law. That area of law has under-
gone a large transition. Administrative law is no longer simply about
property rights. 105 It is, instead, a system for allocating power. This al-
location of power generally follows the scheme of our tripartite system of
government: Congress grants power to the agencies and gives them di-
rection, the agencies implement these directives, and the courts ensure
that the agencies are faithful to their duties under the law. This alloca-
tion of power also means that the agencies may not act in a vacuum.
Citizens have been permitted to influence the administrative process by
participating in agency proceedings. Here, again, we see a movement
away from administrative law as strictly a system for protecting property
rights.106
To recognize these developments is to suggest the character of re-
forms needed in the administrative process. First, we need to recognize
that the administrative process is shaped largely by statutory restrictions
on agency action. When regulatory circumstances change, statutes may
become outmoded. Agency officials, however, cannot change direction
on their own. Congress needs to monitor the administrative environment
102. Smith, supra note 1, at 427 (editor's abstract).
103. Id. at 457-58.
104. See Smith, supra note 9, at 67 (advocating a return to the "concept of natural law as a
remedy for judicial activism").
105. Compare Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 57 (1905) ("It is a question of which of two
powers or rights shall prevail-the power of the State to legislate or the right of the individual to
liberty of person and freedom of contract.") with West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 392
(1937) ("[F]reedom of contract is a qualified and not an absolute right. There is no absolute freedom
to do as one wills or to contract as one chooses. The guaranty of liberty does not withdraw from
legislative supervision that wide department of activity which consists of the making of contracts, or
deny to government the power to provide restrictive safeguards.") (quoting Chicago, B. & Q.R.R. v.
McGuire, 219 U.S. 549, 567 (1911)).
106. This movement is most evident in the demise of the right/privilege doctrine. That doctrine
held that a citizen was not entitled to due process unless he held a liberty or property right. Com-
pare McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 220 (1892) (Holmes, J.) (finding "no
constitutional right to be a policeman") with Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571 (1972)
("[Tihe Court has fully and finally rejected the wooden distinction between 'rights' and 'privileges'
that once seemed to govern the applicability of procedural due process rights.").
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and respond to change. One valuable tool to aid this monitoring function
is the "Sunset" bill, which requires periodic review of all regulatory
statutes. 10 7
Second, we must adopt a healthy balance between regulatory effi-
ciency and public participation in the regulatory process. In particular,
we need to remember that procedures that are fair and necessary in one
context may not be appropriate in another. The passage of the Regula-
tory Flexibility Act of 1980, which provided some relief to small busi-
nesses, was a healthy step in that direction. 108
Finally, we need to realize that the administrative process was not
designed to attack only a single problem, or to function only for the short
term. If we abandon judicial review to permit deregulation today, we
also abandon it under another administration that wishes to increase reg-
ulation. We must, instead, take the long-term view. Improvements in
the administrative process will require universal support. We should be
guided by the twin stars of fairness and efficiency, no matter what polit-
ical course we choose to steer.
107. See S. 2, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 125 CONG. REC. 168-75 (1979).
108. 5 U.S.C. §§ 601-612 (1982). See Verkuil, A Critical Guide to the Regulatory Flexibility Act,
1982 DUKE L.J. 213.
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